The Problem with B.F. Skinner’s Radical Behaviorism as an Explanatory Model for All Human Action
Behaviorism is the idea that hypotheses about psychological events should be confirmed based on behavioral data. There are three main behaviorist claims which are all independent from one another: methodological behaviorism, psychological behaviorism, and analytical behaviorism. In Science and Human Behavior, B. F. Skinner combines all three claims into a rejection of the idea of “inner causes,” and argues for radical behaviorism on the grounds that mental states are unknowable and therefore do not belong in explanations of behavior. Instead, Skinner argues that all human action can be explained by the simple understanding of external stimuli and response as well as learning history and reinforcement. Another way to put this is that all behavior is modified and explained by rewards and punishments as is the case in his operant conditioning. While there are many compelling advantages to Skinner’s behaviorist approach, particularly in the context of the available evidence at the time and as compared to prior theories, modern developments in the study of the mind have highlighted major drawbacks to behaviorism which ultimately make it an incomplete and fundamentally non-viable approach to developing a full and proper understanding of the mind, action, and behavior.
Methodological behaviorism is the claim that mental states are private entities and do not fall under the domain of empirical psychology and is therefore interested in the science of behavior, not the science of the mind as something entirely different from behavior. Psychological behaviorism is the claim that all human behavior is to be explained solely in terms of external stimuli and response as well as learning history and reinforcement. Analytical behaviorism is a theory of meaning that claims the concept of a mental state is just the concept of certain behavioral tendencies of a subject given different circumstances. Analytical behaviorism takes the mind to not be something separate from the body and therefore rejects the mind-body dualism argued for by Descartes in his Meditations and correspondence with queen Elisabeth (Correspondence, 20). Skinner’s radical behaviorism combines all three behaviorist claims to argue against the idea of inner causes which include neural causes or an explanation of behavior rooted in describing material occurrences in the physical brain, psychic causes or the idea that we are moved by some immaterial inner spirit which is separate from the body, and conceptual causes or attributing behavior to a state of mind. Skinner’s argument is based on the idea that mental states are unobservable and should not be incorporated into explanations of behavior.
Radical behaviorism is compelling for many reasons. Firstly, because radical behaviorism predates neuroscience or the computer model of the brain, it presents a much more scientific and empirically grounded approach to studying the mind as compared to the formerly prevailing Freudianism of the time. As a counter-reaction to Freudianism, radical behaviorism promised a greater degree of evidential transparency as all radical behaviorist claims are to be based solely on empirical observation. Another compelling advantage is that radical behaviorism offers a greater degree of explanatory simplicity by operating on the compelling argument that explanations which involve the idea of mental states are presupposing the very thing they are attempting to justify whereas environment and behavior are directly observable and therefore do not need to be justified. Therefore, if an explanation can be developed which does not require reference to an unobservable inner cause and instead only employs those explanatory things which can be directly and objectively observed, this second approach is simpler and preferable and this is exactly what radical behaviorism offers.
Despite the compelling arguments in favor of radical behaviorism, there are fundamental problems with this approach. Firstly, behaviorism presents an explanatory vacuity in its inability to account for certain phenomena such as latent learning which is when information outside of the direct stimulus pattern plays a role in the development of behavior. In a paper called Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men, Tolman discusses how rats are able to generalize beyond behavior and form mental representations of space, cognitive maps, when there are changes in the facts on the ground (Tolman, 203). Cognitive maps are a kind of latent learning whose existence behaviorism would be unable to allow or account for as cognitive maps suggest the existence of mental states which cannot be described solely in terms of external stimuli and response or learning history and reinforcement and yet still retain a place in empirical psychology. Another mental phenomena which highlights this explanatory vacuity is the findings of processing studies which implicate mental structure such as Marr’s rotation of shape experiment wherein he measured the tracking time taken by subjects to find the correct rotation of a shape and the degree of rotation and found a direct correlation between the two which suggests that we are able to form mental representations and manipulations (Marr, 11). While Skinner claims that the ability to study the mind resides in its environment not in the organism, the existence of mental representations and manipulations as shown by Marr directly counters this idea as well as countering the methodological claim that mental states are private entities and the analytical claim that mental states do not really exist and are just behavioral tendencies (Skinner, 40). In addition, radical behaviorism is self-falsifying in that it holds that mental states such as belief do not exist, yet to believe in behaviorism, as Skinner does, is to do the very thing he claims does not exist.
Furthermore, radical behaviorism fails to acknowledge that qualitative experiences of mental states are not behaviors or dispositions to behave. The development of large language models is an example which highlights this idea because we have developed machines which can respond to language, but have no internal qualitative experience of understanding what they are saying. In Chomsky’s review of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior, Chomsky highlights the problems with Skinner's attempt to explain human language in behaviorist terms and in doing so opens the door to algorithmic, neurological and computational descriptions of processing in the brain as more promising alternatives. Chomsky argues that the techniques and terminologies used by behaviorism, when applied to human language outside of the lab, are at minimum no better than corresponding mentalistic options when construed broadly or even fail entirely when construed narrowly (Chomsky, 29). Chomsky argues that behaviorism fails to provide any account for language acquisition (Chomsky, 44).
While Skinner’s radical behaviorism initially appeared promising as a more scientific approach to the study of human action as compared to prior approaches and in the context of the available evidence, more recent developments in our understanding of the mind have revealed behaviorism’s fundamental limitations. Latent learning, cognitive maps, Marr’s mental representations and manipulations, qualitative experiences of mental states, and language acquisition all demonstrate behaviorism’s explanatory vacuity by serving as examples of existent mental phenomena in the realm of empirical psychology which cannot be accounted for or explained purely in terms of external stimuli and response or learning history and reinforcement. While it could be argued that in some cases, it is true that “reward makes a behavior more likely, punishment less so,” evidence of mental states and non-behavioral phenomena in favor of algorithmic, neurological and computational descriptions of brain processing elucidate why radical behaviorism is fundamentally wrong in its belief that “with this simple idea we may explain all human action."
Works Cited
Chomsky, Review of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior
Correspondence between Elizabeth of Bohemia and Descartes, pp. 9-21
Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, pp.20-22, 61-62
Marr, Vision, Ch.1, pp.8-31
Skinner,excerpts from Science and Human Behavior
Tolman, E.C.(1948).Cognitive maps in rats and men. Psychological Review, 55(4), 189–208
